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ARGUMENT
I.

FIRST AMERICAN AND COOK BOTH PROXIMATELY CAUSED
HOLMES' DAMAGES BY PREPARING AND EXECUTING
FAULTY DEEDS AND MISREPRESENTING COOK'S ABILITY TO
CONVEY THE PROPERTY AT ISSUE.
First American and Cook each argue in similar fashion that they did not

cause Holmes' damages. Both point to the successful litigation and defense of
Holmes' title pursuant to the policy of title insurance in support of such
arguments. However, First American and Cook ignore the clear law of proximate
cause and the fact that there can be more than one proximate cause of Holmes'
damages. Because these arguments are intertwined with the issues of what duties
each of the Defendants are charged with in this matter and whether or not said
duties were subsequently breached, Holmes addresses these issues on an
individual basis, Defendant by Defendant.
A.

First American Proximately Caused Holmes' Damages by Preparing
Deeds That Made Holmes' Title Vulnerable and Subject to Attack.
First American myopically assumes that the only duties it owed to Holmes

are those outlined by the policy of title insurance it issued to Holmes at closing.
Even if such were true, First American nevertheless breached its obligations in
defending Holmes' title to the land in question and the issue of whether or not
there was a breach is a question of fact that cannot be resolved by summary

1

proceedings. Saunders v. Sharp. 793 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah App. 1990) (issue of
whether or not party breached its contractual obligations is a question of fact for
the factfinder).
First American fails to address in its Brief the argument asserted by Holmes
in opposition to First American's Motion to Dismiss that the title insurance policy
requires First American to take "appropriate action" in defense of Holmes' title
and in honoring its contractual duties under the title insurance policy and that First
American failed to take appropriate action when it prepared a flawed Special
Warranty Deed that required litigation and a corrective affidavit to validate. (R. at
85-86; T. at 27-28.) The same argument is clearly made in Holmes' initial
Appellate Brief. See Holmes Brief, p. 16,20-26.
Again, the question of whether or not First American took appropriate
action is a question of fact. Brown v. Weis. 871 P.2d 552, 565 (Utah App. 1994)
("whether a breach has occurred is generally one of fact, not law, and thus is
ordinarily left to the jury or finder of fact.") (citations omitted). The trial court
completely ignored this question in its ruling and order. (R. at 255-56, 261-65.) It
also, in implicitly rejecting this argument, resolved a question of fact that was
disputed by Holmes. Again, questions of fact that are material and disputed may
not be resolved through summary judgment. Cache County v. Beus. 1999 UT
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App 134, 978 P.2d 1043. The trial court erred in ignoring and/or rejecting out of
hand Holmes' argument that First American did not take appropriate action to
defend Holmes' title when it prepared a Special Warranty Deed that contained a
clerical error and opened the door for an adverse claim to Holmes' title.
It is also undisputed that First American's own errors1 set the stage for the
eventual adverse claim to Holmes' title. First American prepared quit claim deeds
designed to convey to Cook the interests of Lake Creek Farms and Lake Creek
Associates in two parcels of real property eventually purchased by Holmes. (R. at
29-30, 164.) One of these deeds was clearly and fatally flawed. Id First
American failed to discover its own error in two subsequent closings involving the
property Holmes purchased. (R. at 3, 164-65.) When it discovered its errors, First
American attempted to remedy the defect in Holmes' title by preparing a Special
Warranty Deed that contained a clerical error later exploited by parties adverse to
Holmes' title. (R. at 3,166-67.)

'First American and Cook conveniently construe Holmes' use of the term
"negligence" to always imply a tort-based cause of action that is necessarily barred by the
economic loss rule. To the contrary, Holmes' use of that term directly refers to the breach
of contract and warranty claims raised by Holmes in its pleadings and arguments before
the trial court. Put in simpler terms, Holmes does not believe Cook or First American
intentionally caused Holmes' damages or purposefully breached their contractual
obligations to Holmes. Instead, Holmes argues that Defendants' negligent behavior
resulted in breaches of the contractual obligations and duties they each owed to Holmes.
3

This series of errors and lapses on First American's part placed Cook in a
position where it was, at the very least, misled and under the erroneous
assumption that it held with good title to the land it eventually sold to Holmes,
even though three-fourths of the property was still owned by Lake Creek Farms,
LLC, not Cook. It is less than genuine for First American to gloss over this fact
and argue that it had nothing to do with the defect in Holmes' title when, but for
First American's own mistakes, the Keystone litigation would not have been
possible and the Warranty Deed from Cook to Holmes would have effectively
conveyed title to Holmes.
Utah law is clear that there can be more than one proximate cause of an
injury. McCorvev v. UDOT. 868 P.2d 41,45 (Utah 1993); Steffensen v. Smith's
Mgmt. Corp.. 820 P.2d 482,486 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Furthermore, the question
of causation is one for the jury and is a question of fact, not law. Id. Therefore,
First American's arguments about causation are just as inappropriate and
irrelevant on appeal as they were before the trial court. In fact, the entire line of
argument about causation is evidence in-fact of the trial court's errors.
Holmes clearly presented evidence and argued the causation issue before
the trial court. (R. at 81-88,78-146; T. at 27.) Specifically, Holmes argued that
"but for First American's negligence and breach of its contractual obligations,

4

Keystone could not have pursued its lawsuit and Holmes would not have been
prevented from selling its lots and improving on its investment." (R. at 84,
paragraph 16; T. at 27.)2 Holmes made similar arguments in its Brief, despite
assertions to the contrary by First American. Holmes' Brief argues that the
Warranty Deed prepared by First American and signed by Cook did not convey
title to Holmes. (Holmes' Brief, p. 12.) Holmes further argued that this defect
and the subsequent defect in the flawed Special Warranty Deed that First
American prepared opened the door for Keystone to lay siege to Holmes' title.
(Holmes' Brief, p. 14.) Similar references to causation are laced throughout
Holmes' Brief. (Holmes' Brief, p. 16,17, 21, 23.)
In short, Holmes' arguments demonstrate a dispute of fact regarding
causation that was erroneously resolved by the trial court in First American's
favor. By ruling for First American, the trial court resolved a material question of
fact through summary judgment and that error must be reversed.

Additional statements of fact further show that Holmes argued before the trial
court that First American's mistakes were the cause of Holmes' damages. (R. at 84,
paragraphs 17 and 18.)
5

B.

Cook Proximately Caused Holmes' Damages by Selling Property it Did
Not Own and in Signing Warranty and Special Warranty Deeds That
Were Flawed and Did Not Properly Convey Title to Holmes.
Cook also argues that it did not cause Holmes' damages and that Holmes

failed to meet its burden in briefing or demonstrating that Cook was a proximate
cause of Holmes' damages. To the contrary, Holmes properly argued at the trial
court that Cook was a proximate cause of Holmes' damages. (R. at 165-66,236;
T. at 31-33.)
The same legal arguments discussed above in response to First American's
Brief apply to Cook. Cook signed a Warranty Deed that did not convey title to
Holmes as promised. (R. at 164, 166, 196.) Cook then, in concert with First
American's request, signed yet another deed, this time a Special Warranty Deed,
in an effort to correct the errors perpetuated by the previous deeds to Cook and
then to Holmes. (R. at 166.) In the Keystone litigation, Cook further attempted to
correct the previous errors by executing and recording a corrective affidavit
wherein he outlined his intentions with respect to the previous deeds. (R. at 13037.) Cook does not dispute that the Special Warranty Deed contained an error.
(R. at 166.) Nevertheless, Cook and First American ignore this fact and argue that
their successful defense of Holmes' title acts as a magic wand and erases, as a

6

matter of law, the intervening 8 months wherein Holmes was unable to market or
sell lots.
The analogy is simple and logical. The successful defense of Holmes' title
and the eventual judicial validation of the Special Warranty Deed by a court of
law did not restore Holmes to the status quo. It did not give back to Holmes the
intervening eight (8) months where it could not sell lots, thereby losing profits,
sales and momentum.
The need for the Special Warranty Deed and the subsequent litigation, lis
pendens and corrective affidavit would have never arisen had First American and
Cook not erred in conveying title to Holmes. Also, Cook and First American
cannot point to any legal authority that allows them to escape the consequences of
their actions simply because Holmes' title was successfully defended. That
argument may have merit for First American insofar as its obligations under the
title insurance policy may be concerned but it does not absolve Cook or First
American for their breach of the contractual duties each owed to Holmes by virtue
of obligations each assumed outside and beyond the title insurance policy. These
additional duties are discussed below in greater detail.3
3

The successful defense of Holmes' title cures but one of thefivewarranties Cook
gave to Holmes in the Warranty Deed. Holmes established before the trial court and in its
initial Brief that the other warranties given to Holmes (in addition to the promise to
defend) were breached and have yet to be cured. (R. at 235-39; Holmes' Brief, 33-37.)
7

The definition of proximate cause is well known.
"Proximate cause is 'that cause which, in natural and continuous
sequence, (unbroken by an efficient intervening cause), produces the
injury and without which the result would not have occurred. It is the
efficient cause-the one that necessarily sets in operation the factors
that accomplish the injury.'"
Steffensen. 820 P.2d at 486 (citations omitted).
Here, the perpetual chain of errors that caused Holmes' damages began
when First American negligently prepared a deed that Cook signed in an effort to
convey property owned by Lake Creek Farms, LLC to Cook. That deed
undisputedly identified the wrong grantor. (R. at 29-31, 164.) Thereafter, Cook,
thinking they owned the property when they did not, attempted to convey the
property to Holmes. Again, First American was involved in this transaction. Id
The actors are the same and they perpetuated their previous errors and passed
them on to Holmes. There is no break in the chain of causation.
Thereafter, when First American discovered its series of errors, it, along
with Cook, attempted to remedy the fatal flaw in Holmes' title by preparing and
executing a Special Warranty Deed that contained a clerical error. (R. at 31,166.)
It was this Special Warranty Deed and the clerical error therein (along with
previous infective conveyances) that Keystone specifically exploited in its legal
action adverse to Holmes' title. (R. 63-77,123-37.) For the sake of argument,
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Holmes agrees that Keystone's efforts to exploit these errors were a cause of
Holmes' damages. However, but for the errors of Cook and First American,
Keystone could not have pursued claims adverse to Holmes' title, regardless of its
motivation. Holmes argues that these facts and Cook's errors (along with those of
First American) are proximate causes of Holmes' damages. (R. at 4-5, paragraphs
8-10; T. at 31-32.)4 At the very least, the issue of causation is a question for the
jury, not the trial court. Thompson v. LeGrand Johnson Constr. Co.. 688 P.2d
489,491 (Utah 1984).
II.

FIRST AMERICAN AND COOK EACH ASSUMED ADDITIONAL
CONTRACTUAL DUTIES BEYOND AND IN ADDITION TO THEIR
OBLIGATIONS PURSUANT TO TITLE INSURANCE AND
WARRANTIES IN DEEDS.
First American and Cook each argue on appeal that whatever duties they

may have owed to Holmes were covered and satisfied by the policy of title
insurance and by First American's successful defense of Holmes' title by virtue of
that insurance. Similar arguments were presented to and accepted by the trial
court. Nevertheless, Holmes has, at each stage of this litigation, argued that both

4

Holmes does not dispute the assertion that the Keystone litigation was without
merit from its perspective. Nevertheless, Keystone could not have brought its action or
had colorable legal arguments and claims but for the chain of errors created by First
American and Cook. Cook and First American opened the door and a less than genuine,
but cognizable claim in the form of Keystone, walked through. (T. at 28.)
9

Cook and First American assumed and breached additional duties beyond those
associated with title insurance.5
A.

Cook Assumed the Additional Duty of Indemnification Pursuant to the
Indemnity Agreements.
On May 18,1998, Cook and Holmes executed an Indemnity Agreement. In

the Indemnity Agreement, Cook covenanted to indemnify and hold Holmes
harmless from:
[a]ny damage, loss or deficiency resulting from any
misrepresentation, breach of warranty or nonfulfillment of any
covenant or agreement on the part of Cook Development under any
agreement or any other document executed in connection with
Holmes' purchase of the Covered Property.
(R. at 180, paragraph (b).) The Indemnity Agreement was executed on the very
day Holmes consummated its purchase from Cook. Holmes is hard pressed to
explain, let alone contradict, Cook's unexplainable and vaporous argument that
this language does not apply to Holmes' damages. Did Cook sign a Warranty
Deed that did not convey title to Holmes? Yes. (R. at 196-97.) Did Cook sign a
Special Warranty Deed that contained an error and required litigation and a
corrective affidavit to validate? Yes. (R. at 123,130-37,199-213.) Cook would
have this Court accept, as the trial court did, the argument that the provisions of
5

Holmes also maintains that First American breached its contractual obligation
under the policy of title insurance that requires it to take "appropriate action" in defending
Holmes' title or in fulfilling its obligations under the title insurance policy. (R. at 85-86.)
10

the Indemnity Agreement were satisfied by the successful defense of Holmes'
title. However, the clear language of the Indemnity Agreement makes Cook liable
for "any damage, loss or deficiency" and does not include a disclaimer or
exception for title insurance.
Paragraph (a) of the Indemnity Agreement does contain an exception that
releases Cook from liability situations covered by the title policy. In paragraph (a)
Cook agrees to indemnify Holmes from:
Any and all claims that arise from, or are in any way related to,
Seller's acquisition, ownership or development of the Covered
Property prior to the date of this Agreement, except for those claims
covered by the title insurance policy to be purchased pursuant to the
Purchase Agreement.
(R. at 180, paragraph (a) (emphasis added).) Had Holmes and Cook desired to
include the exception found in paragraph (a) of the Indemnity Agreement in
paragraph (b) it would have been a simple task. Of course, including the title
insurance exception in paragraph (b) would not have changed matters. The title
insurance policy does not cover Holmes' damages because First American
pursued an alternative course in defending title as opposed to indemnifying
Holmes. (R. at 139-46.) Put in other terms, Cook agreed in paragraph (b) of the
Indemnity Agreement to indemnify Holmes for any and all damages Holmes
sustained by virtue of Cook's errors, negligence and breach of warranties

11

regardless of whether or not Holmes' damages are covered by the title insurance
policy.6 (R. at 180.)
Cook again relies on case law for the proposition that successful defense of
Holmes' title precludes Holmes from collecting its damages from Cook. Again,
the Indemnity Agreement says otherwise and is an affirmative covenant assumed
by Cook. Furthermore, case law in Utah clearly allows parties to collect damages
they sustain when one or more warranties in deeds of conveyance are breached.
See Creason v. Peterson. 470 P.2d 403 (Utah 1970); Van Cott v. Jacklin. 226 P.
460 (Utah 1924).7
Also, Holmes' Complaint alleges that Cook breached the Indemnity
Agreement by failing to indemnify Holmes for its damages. (R. at 17, paragraph
102.) This is a direct "breach of contract" claim. Additionally, Holmes' Second

6

Cook illogically argues that the principle of indemnification applies only to
damage caused by a third party and does not apply to the indemnitor. (Cook's Appellate
Brief, p. 27.) However, Cook utterly fails to offer any evidence or support in case law or
statute for its position. In fact, Black's Law Dictionary defines "indemnify" with the
following language. "To restore the victim of a loss, in whole or in part.... To save
harmless; to secure against loss or damage
" Nothing in Black's Law Dictionary or in
case law supports the proposition that an indemnitor's obligation to indemnify is triggered
only when the loss is caused by someone other than the indemnitor.
7

Cook gallantly attempts, but fails to distinguish Creason and Van Cott. Both
stand for the proposition that where there has been a breach of warranty, the grantee is
entitled to recover "the damage he suffers as a result of the breach thereof. " Creason. 470
P.2d at 404. Neither Creason or Van Cott restrict the recoverable damages to only those
situations where the grantee actually loses a portion of what he or she purchased.
12

Cause of Action references both direct breach of contract claims against First
American and Cook as well as indirect third party beneficiary claims. (R. at 15.)
Specifically, Holmes' Complaint references the breach of contract that occurred
with the preparation, execution and recording of the Warranty Deed signed by
Cook and designed to convey title directly to Holmes. (R. at 15, paragraph 86.)
These questions of fact simply cannot be resolved through summary judgment and
the trial court clearly erred when it did just that.8
In short, Cook assumed several duties. Warranties were given through two
different deeds. The second Special Warranty Deed was specifically used in the
context of Holmes' efforts to procure financing. (R. at 31, 84-85, 130-37,16566.) Holmes is entitled to recover its damages under the breach of warranty issues
alone. However, Holmes is also entitled to indemnification for "any damage, loss
or deficiency" Holmes sustains by virtue of Cook's misrepresentations. (R. at
180.) Holmes' Complaint and the arguments it presented to the trial court are

8

Both Cook and First American argue that Holmes' Complaint says nothing about
breach of contract claims and, instead, refers only to breaches in the third party
beneficiary context. Perhaps Holmes' claims are not artfully pled or as clear as they
could be. However, direct breach of contract claims are referenced in Holmes' Complaint
and, when coupled with Holmes' arguments in opposition to Defendants' motions to
dismiss and Holmes' request and motion to amend its Complaint, clearly place the trial
court and the parties on notice of Holmes' claims.
13

clear and unmistakable on this issue. Either way, Cook is liable for Holmes'
damages even though title was eventually quieted in Holmes.
B.

First American Performed Additional Work Outside of the Title Policy
for Holmes, Thereby Assuming Additional Duties That Were Breached
When First American Erred in Preparing Deeds.
Had First American simply issued a title insurance commitment report and

title insurance in the transaction between Holmes and Cook, its arguments would
have some merit. However, First American ignores the meaningful evidence and
clear questions of fact presented by Holmes' arguments before the trial court and
in its initial Brief. Specifically, First American conducted the closing and
prepared and recorded deeds, activities that are clearly separate and apart from the
issuance of title insurance. (R. at 30-31, 119-21,123-28,130-37.)
First American would have this court accept the same illogical argument
that the trial court accepted, which is that the additional services performed by
First American for a profit are nevertheless gratuitous and fall under the protective
umbrella of title insurance. Cook and Holmes did not have to use First American
for the closing. They could have had their own legal counsel prepare the deeds
and handle the closing. This would have been a logical approach because the
preparation of documents that fix legal relationships between parties constitutes
the practice of law. Utah State Bar v. Summerhayes & Hayden Pub. Adjusters.

14

905 P.2d 867, 870 (Utah 1995). Even if the preparation of deeds does not
constitute the practice of law (a point Holmes does not concede), preparing deeds
in a professional capacity, either gratuitously or for a fee, brings with that service
the duty to do so in a competent and professional manner.9
Holmes' argument on this point is simple and ignored by First American.
The settlement statement shows that First American charged Holmes and Cook
$300.00 each for settlement and closing fees (R. at 120, line 1101), $120.00 to
Cook for releases and $15.00 to Holmes (R. at 120, line 1201), for recording an
ineffective and worthless Warranty Deed in violation of the law (R. at 90, n.5).
See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-20-110(a) (Supp. 1985) Even though it feels justified
in charging these fees, First American argues that the services it rendered merit
charging a fee to the parties to the transaction. It then goes on to argue that
9

First American cannot argue that its failure to charge for the preparation of the
Warranty Deed signed by Cook at closing was gratuitous and that it had no duty to
prepare the deed in a competent and professional manner. Utah law regularly and
consistently holds volunteers or gratuitous providers of services liable when they breach
the duties that attach in that process. See Hansen v. Oregon Short Line R.R. Co.. 55 Utah
577, 582,188 P. 852, 854 (1920) (carrier held liable for damages to non-paying
passenger); Warren v. Robison.19 Utah 289, 300, 57 P. 287, 290 (1899) (the duties
attached to service as an officer or director of a corporation may not be avoided because
the officer or director served gratuitously and without compensation). First American
also fails to refer to the Utah Liability Protection for Volunteers Act (the "Act") found at
Utah Code Annotated § 78-19-1. Of course, this statutory exception to the general rule
that duties of care and liability for the breach of those duties attach even in situations
where payment occurs does not help First American. The Act only applies to non-profit
entities and other individuals performing services for non-profit corporations or entities.
It has no application here.
15

despite these charges, it did not charge the parties for deed or document
preparation. It is less than genuine for First American to argue that it is
nevertheless immune from criticism or suit because it also sold the parties title
insurance and successfully defended a challenge to Holmes' title.
In short, First American wore two hats in the transaction. It insured title
and, for a fee, assisted the parties in closing the transaction. Even if First
American performed all of these services free of charge and simply out of courtesy
as a reward for purchasing title insurance, a mere volunteer may still be held liable
for its mistakes and form a contractual relationship even when no fees are
assessed. At the very least, a question of fact is presented by the charges assessed
by First American.
III.

HOLMES CLEARLY MOVED FOR LEAVE TO AMEND ITS
COMPLAINT AND COMPLIED WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF
RULES 7 AND 15 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
In Utah, "[the Rules of Civil Procedure] must all be read in the light of their

fundamental purpose of both pleading and procedure to the end that the parties are
afforded the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate contentions they have
pertaining to their dispute." Timm v. Dewsnup. 851 P.2d 1178,1183 (Utah 1993)
(quoting Chenev v. Rucker. 14 Utah 2d 205,211,381 P.2d 86, 91 (1963)). The
Utah Supreme Court also stated more specifically that '"[t]he policy of the law is

16

toward liberality in the allowance of amendments and to icgaid tin m l,i\ uiabl> in
order that the real controversy between the pt
determined, and the cause decide
530, 538- ••
i'.

:,

, >resented, their rights
.* Johnson v. Brinkerhoff. 89 Utah

.,.
Itah Rules of Civil Procedure is also important in this

analyse U Mates that:
[a]n application to the court for an order shall be made by motion
which, unless made during a hearing or trial, shall be made in writing,
shall state with particularity the grounds therefore, and shall set forth
the relief or order sought. The requirement of writing is fulfilled if
the motion is stated in a written notice of the hearing of the motion.
(emphasis added). Here, Holmes i npit sit A Irnvc of court to amend its complaint.
Point III of Holm*

of Points and Authorities in Opposition to First

Amen-. an Moli< ni " > Dismiss is devoted entirely to Holmes' request to amend its
Complaint <K at 92.) Holmes also requested the same opportunity 1o aincml in
its Memorandum in Opposition to Cook's Motion to Dismiss.

.)

Holmes admits that it did not file a separate pleading l!>;*• was labeled as a
"Motion." Holmes also admits thai

n ' of the amended complaint

in conjunction witn
requirements arc
h

IHTIIIIM

menu. However, no such
ither Rule 7 or 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil

lii f';i< I Rule 7(b)(1) allows aparty to avoid the requirement of a
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writing simply by making the motion during "a hearing or trial." This Holmes
did. Holmes specifically referenced its desire to amend its Complaint in the
hearing held on First American's and Cook's motions to dismiss. (T. at 27.)
The Utah Supreme Court errs in favor of allowing amendments despite the
fact that, at times, the manner in which leave of court is sought is less than artfully
pled.
Some tempest has been raised about the court allowing the plaintiff to
make tardy amendments to the pleadings
The pleadings are never
more important than the case that is before the court
There can be
no prejudice in this case because we'll give ample time for an answer.
. . . This is in harmony with what we regard as the correct policy: of
recognizing the desirability of the pleadings setting forth definitely
framed issues, but also of permitting amendment where the interest of
justice so requires, and the adverse party is given a fair opportunity to
meet it.
Lewis v. Moultree. 627 P.2d 94, 98 (Utah 1981) (quoting Thomas J. Peck & Sons.
Inc. v. Lee Rock Products. Inc.. 30 Utah 2d 187, 193, 515 P.2d 446, 449-50
(1973)).
The argument that Holmes did not offer sufficient detail about what it
would do if allowed to amend its Complaint is also less than genuine. In Point III
of its Memorandum in Opposition to First American's Motion to Dismiss, Holmes
clearly refers to the arguments and positions identified in detail in the body of its
opposing memorandum. (R. at 92.) Those arguments are arguably part of
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Holmes' Complaint, but would have been clarified and more ;

>

include the claims that First American and Cook assun u
duties beyond those associated with th

contractual
y and deeds and that

they breached those obligations.
In short,: >.
have

k • 1111,111 < i i 'ook cannot point to any prejudice that would
on by the trial court to allow Holmes leave to amend its

v

discovery had taken place. There was no established in;il dale.

'•^ trial court, First American and Cook were all clearly aw.n e < >l Holnu's'
request to amend prior to and during the hearing. 11' .i' l l ^7, I :ii ,'7.) In fact,
nothing had occurred beyond the filing o

•: nplaint and the Defendants'

respective motions to dismiss ' iiiii -i iiitialrly. the trial court ignored Holmes'
arguments and chose in i »a*)i a rather harsh and abrupt conclusion that deprived
Holme:-, ol llu oppiiwiiiiv to be heard and its grievances addressed.
CONCLUSION
Holmes' request for relief on appeal is simple,
heard and considered before the same is dismisses I < H I I I 11"
and Cook made mistakes that damaged

First American

hat much is not in dispute.
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Holmes respectfully requests this Court to reverse the trial court's orders granting
summary judgment and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.
Dated this &£ day of May, 2001
BENNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE

Barry N. Johnsoni,
Daniel L. Steele
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Appellant Holmes Development, LLC
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